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Abstract 
We find that firms are less likely to report an internal control material weakness (as mandated by 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) in a given year if one of their audit committee members is concurrently 
on the board of a firm that disclosed a material weakness within the prior three years. We find a 
similar spillover effect for financial restatement disclosures. The spillover from material 
weakness disclosures is evident only if a shared director has more experience with the disclosing 
firm or can channel more information about the disclosed material weakness. Our findings 
suggest that prior director experiences outside the firm influence the work of audit committees 
inside the firm. One rationale is that a director’s prior experience with an adverse disclosure 
helps diffuse important insights and serves as a catalyst for improvements in a firm’s internal 
control and financial reporting practices. An alternative explanation, which we cannot dismiss, 
holds that a director’s prior experience helps a firm to under-report material weaknesses and 
financial restatements without any attendant improvements in the underlying practices.  
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1. Introduction 
Internal controls exist to safeguard the financial reporting process; their importance is 
highlighted by section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) which requires firms to annually 
disclose an auditor-certified assessment of internal controls. While prior studies have focused 
mostly on the economic consequences for firms disclosing material weaknesses (e.g., Beneish et 
al. 2008), we examine whether such disclosures have spillover effects on other firms. 
Specifically, we predict and find that firms are less likely to report an internal control material 
weakness (hereafter ICMW) in a given year if an audit committee member on their board 
concurrently serves on the board of a firm that disclosed an ICMW within the prior three years. 
We find a similar spillover effect for financial restatement disclosures. One explanation for our 
findings is that an audit committee member’s prior experience with an adverse disclosure helps 
diffuse important insights and serves as a catalyst for improvements in a firm’s control and 
reporting practices. The implication is that public disclosures of negative events, such as those 
mandated by SOX, have positive spillovers, a benefit of SOX previously unrecognized in the 
literature. An alternative explanation, which we cannot dismiss, holds that a director’s prior 
experience helps a firm to under-report control weaknesses and financial misstatements without 
undertaking attendant improvements. 
Although shared directors are an important direct channel for inter-firm information 
transmission (e.g., Mizruchi 1996), we use a measure that is more germane to our setting where 
we require that a connecting director serves on the audit committee of the connected firm. We 
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expect audit committee members with prior ICMW or financial restatement disclosure 
experience to have the information, incentive, and ability to substantively influence their firm’s 
practices. For instance, audit committees that learn about ICMW disclosures of others are likely 
reminded of their own fiduciary responsibilities and thus are more vigilant in monitoring and 
improving their own internal controls. Similarly, we expect audit committees that learn about the 
economic consequences of ICMW disclosures or financial restatements to be motivated to 
improve their own practices. These are positive spillovers and reflect how public disclosures 
such as those mandated by SOX deter control and financial reporting deficiencies. 
However, because we do not observe firms’ ICMWs and misstatements directly and only 
observe what firms disclose, we acknowledge that audit committee members with such prior 
experiences can also influence their firms’ reporting practices more superficially. For instance, 
connecting directors, cognizant of the costs and consequences of ICMW disclosures, may ensure 
that their firms under-report ICMWs. Indeed, there is evidence in the literature that suggests that 
firms, on the whole, tend to under-report their ICMWs and restatements (DeFond and Lennox 
2017; Files et al. 2009; Lennox and Li 2017; Rice and Weber 2012). Thus, for connecting 
directors, this motivation to under-report is potentially alluring. But unfortunately, we cannot 
empirically distinguish between a connecting director’s motivation to under-report and the 
motivation to improve internal control and financial reporting practices. 
Our analysis is based on a sample of firms with available director information and covers the 
period from November 2004, when SOX section 404 annual disclosures of internal control 
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assessments became available, through December 2012. For each firm-year observation in our 
sample, we indicate whether an audit committee member of a firm concurrently serves on the 
board of another firm that disclosed an ICMW (or alternatively, a financial restatement) within 
the prior three years (labeled as a connected firm). We find that connected firms are less likely to 
disclose an ICMW than firms that are not connected. For instance, we find that a connected 
firm’s probability of disclosing an ICMW is 2.9 percent, which is less than 3.8 percent for the 
typical sample firm. We find a similar spillover for financial restatements and note that a 
connected firm’s probability of having a misstatement is 4.5 percent which is less than 5.4 
percent for the typical sample firm. At the same time, we find that other connections, such as 
having the same auditor or operating in the same industry, have no discernable effects on a 
firm’s probability of disclosing an ICMW or financial misstatement.1 These findings imply that 
connecting audit committee directors serve as an important spillover mechanism and that these 
types of spillovers are potentially present in other settings with similar adverse disclosures.2 
To bolster our main findings that connecting directors use their prior experiences to influence 
their firms’ behaviors, we conduct two cross-sectional tests to identify conditions under which 
spillovers from ICMW disclosures are more clearly evident. First, we examine the impact of a 
connecting director’s experience with the disclosing firm based on the intuition that connecting 
directors with more relevant experience can internalize ICMW-related events more fully and thus 
1 We also do not find any evidence that audit committee members with prior ICMW disclosure experience have a 
discernable effect on a firm’s likelihood of disclosing a financial misstatement. This finding suggests that ICMW-
connections do not affect reporting quality, at least as measured by financial misstatements. 
2 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting that an important implication of our finding is that if the public 
disclosure of an ICMW has spillovers, then such spillovers should manifest in other settings as well. 
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channel information to connected firms more effectively. Using three different proxies to 
measure a connecting director’s experience, we find that the spillover is evident only if a 
connecting director has relevant experience at the disclosing firm. 
The second cross-sectional variation we consider is the magnitude of information about the 
underlying ICMW that connecting directors can potentially convey. We expect the spillover to 
be stronger when information about the prior ICMW is more substantive and thus more 
beneficial to connected firms. Consistent with this intuition, we find that a connected firm is less 
likely to disclose an ICMW if the disclosing firm’s ICMW is considered to be more pervasive.  
We also provide a number of additional tests and sensitivity analyses to address measurement 
challenges and concerns about alternative interpretations. For instance, one concern is that 
connecting directors are inherently of higher quality than unconnected directors and hence our 
spillover findings are due to the quality of connecting directors rather than their prior 
experiences. A second concern is that our findings may be due to director selection whereby 
firms select directors with particular ICMW disclosure experience or directors select firms that 
are less likely to have internal control problems. While we acknowledge these concerns as 
potential limitations, supplementary analyses in section 5 suggest that these concerns are 
unlikely to explain our results. 
Our main finding that the public disclosure of an ICMW disclosure (or a financial 
restatement) has the potential to create positive spillovers stands in contrast to recent papers that 
document negative spillovers from board connections (e.g., Bizjak et al. 2009; Chiu et al. 2013). 
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In contrast to our setting, we note that the practices studied in prior literature are largely private 
and their consequences do not materialize publicly until after the disclosure. In section 5.4, we 
highlight this contrast and reconcile our result with prior literature.  
Our findings contribute to prior literature in three ways. First, we contribute to the disclosure 
literature by highlighting how mandated disclosures can generate spillovers. Whereas Cai et al. 
(2014) find that firms imitate the voluntary disclosure policies of other firms, we find that when 
the disclosure is mandated, board connections inform connected firms on how to best avoid the 
same deficient practice. Subject to the caveat that connected firms are not merely under-reporting 
their deficiencies, the evidence suggests public disclosures help deter negative practices.  
Second, we contribute to the literature that addresses the costs and benefits of SOX 
legislation. Although the costs and benefits of SOX compliance are the subject of much debate 
(e.g. Hochberg et al. 2009; Linck et al. 2009), the focus has been primarily on disclosing firms. 
Our findings suggest that the SOX-related disclosures can also have beneficial spillovers for a 
broader set of firms, suggesting that those disclosures likely enhance the effectiveness of the law 
(Scholz 1984).  
Third, we add to the literature that examines the role of audit committees in the financial 
reporting process. By demonstrating how connected audit committee members affect firms’ 
internal control and reporting practices, we highlight the distinctive role audit committees play in 
transmitting information across firms. Specifically, our study sheds light on how the experiences 
of audit committee members outside the firm can impact their role inside the firm.  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide an overview of the 
related literature and motivate our hypotheses. In section 3, we describe our sample and 
empirical methods. In section 4, we present our main results and related evidence. In section 5, 
we provide additional evidence and some robustness tests. In the final section, we conclude.  
2. Motivation and hypotheses 
Prior studies show that firms that publicly disclose ICMWs experience negative stock 
returns, higher audit fees, and higher costs of debt and equity (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009; 
Beneish et al. 2008; Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Hoitash et al. 2008). While the evidence is clear that 
ICMW disclosures have adverse consequences for disclosing firms, whether such disclosures 
have spillover effects on other firms is largely unexplored. 
In this section, we motivate the hypothesis that ICMW disclosures generate spillovers for 
firms connected to disclosing firms through shared board directors. We focus on shared directors 
for two reasons. First, because board members are privy to information and insights within their 
networks beyond what is directly available to firm executives, directors provide firsthand 
decision-making and monitoring information to most firms (e.g., Mizruchi 1996). Second, 
because audit committee members are specifically charged with overseeing internal controls 
(DeZoort 1997), connecting directors who experience ICMW disclosures elsewhere are in a 
unique position to influence the work of audit committees on which they serve.  
Connecting directors can influence the work of audit committees in two distinct ways. 
Directors with prior ICMW disclosure experience can provide constructive insights and serve as 
7 
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a catalyst for audit committees to improve their firms’ internal controls. This is a positive 
spillover, a real consequence of SOX-mandated ICMW disclosures and a testament to the law’s 
effectiveness.3 However, the spillover can also be superficial. For instance, because the presence 
of ICMWs is not observable or easily detectable by outsiders, connecting directors can ensure 
that ICMWs are “under-reported” to the public even without improvements in internal controls.  
There are several reasons we expect ICMW disclosures to generate a positive spillover. First, 
psychology literature notes that observing a peer’s misdeeds will make the deed more salient and 
remind one of his/her own ethical standards, thus making the imitation of those misdeeds 
unlikely (Gino et al. 2009). Hence, we expect that audit committees that learn about ICMW 
disclosures of others through a connecting director are reminded of their own fiduciary 
responsibility to monitor and maintain sufficiently strong internal controls.  
Second, social theory suggests that observing the punishment of a peer for a negative act 
reinforces the social norms against that act and reduces the chances of imitation (Bandura 1971). 
In contrast, when negative behavior is private, difficult to detect, or unpunished, the behavior 
appears socially acceptable and thus imitable (Bandura 1965). Accordingly, we contend that an 
ICMW disclosure and its attendant repercussions reinforce the notion to connected firms that 
weak controls are not socially (or legally) acceptable. 
3 Since its passage much has been written about the costs and benefits of SOX. For instance, prior studies have 
highlighted the costs in terms of compliance costs, reduced profitability, and increased director-related costs (Iliev 
2010; Linck et al. 2009). Other papers suggest that SOX has reduced agency concerns (Hochberg et al. 2009) and 
strengthened investor protections (Leuz et al. 2008). However, the idea that a SOX-mandated disclosure creates 
positive spillovers for other “connected” firms is a unique feature of our paper. 
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Third, economic theory suggests that all decisions, including decisions to upgrade or modify 
internal controls, reflect a fundamental cost-benefit tradeoff (Becker 1968). Accordingly, we 
expect that when the consequences and potential remedies of ICMW disclosures become 
apparent, connecting directors relay that information to their audit committees and shift the cost-
benefit tradeoff in favor of improving internal controls.  
A cost-benefit tradeoff also explains why connecting directors may encourage under-
reporting of ICMWs, even without improvements in internal controls. Because ICMW 
disclosures have negative consequences for disclosing firms (e.g., higher costs of debt and equity 
as noted earlier), firms may not always disclose known material control weaknesses (DeFond 
and Lennox 2017; Rice and Weber 2012). For connecting directors, cognizant of the costs and 
consequences of ICMW disclosures, this motivation to under-report is potentially alluring. 
The previous discussion suggests that a connecting director’s motivation, either to improve 
internal controls or under-report ICMWs, implies that firms are less likely to disclose material 
control weaknesses if they are connected, through an audit committee member, to a firm that 
previously disclosed its own material control weakness. Thus: 
HYPOTHESIS 1. Firms are less likely to disclose internal control material weaknesses if they 
are connected, through an audit committee member, to a firm that previously disclosed its 
own internal control material weakness. 
Although our focus is on the spillover effects of SOX-mandated ICMW disclosures, we note 
that the arguments underlying H1 are more general; namely that public disclosures of an adverse 
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practice by others have a spillover effect on connected firms. Thus, we expect H1 to prevail in 
other settings where adverse practices are publicly disclosed and acknowledged. In particular, we 
consider the disclosure of financial restatements, a setting widely investigated in the accounting 
literature and one that is closely linked to firms’ internal control practices. As in H1, we expect 
firms are less likely to have a misstatement that subsequently leads to a financial restatement if 
they are connected, through an audit committee member, to a firm that previously reported a 
financial restatement. The reasons parallel those discussed earlier for H1. Unfortunately, neither 
improvements in internal controls nor financial reporting quality are observable; hence, the 
motivation to under-report restatements remains a factor in this setting as well. Connecting 
directors with prior financial restatement experience can provide constructive insights that help 
avoid similar restatements, or connecting directors can ensure that restatements are under-
reported.4 We have: 
HYPOTHESIS 2. Firms are less likely to misstate their financial statements if they are 
connected, through an audit committee member, to a firm that previously restated its 
financial statements. 
Although we present H1 and H2 as distinct hypotheses, their implications are necessarily 
linked. Because most internal controls exist to safeguard the financial reporting process, it 
follows that persistent control weaknesses reduce financial reporting quality and improvements 
in internal controls improve financial reporting quality. Hence, to the extent that connecting 
4 Lennox and Li (2017) suggest that financial restatements are under-reported by documenting that among firms that 
resolved a lawsuit brought against them for an accounting issue, only 24.6 percent reported a restatement.  
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directors with prior ICMW disclosure experience improve their firms’ internal controls (rather 
than merely under-report ICMWs), we would expect financial reporting quality to improve as 
well. We test for this possibility in a supplementary hypothesis where we assume that 
misstatements are an indication of financial reporting quality (Chiu et al. 2013). 
Unfortunately, because neither improvements in internal controls nor financial reporting quality 
are observable, we recognize the motivation to under-report restatements remains a factor in this 
setting as well. We have: 
HYPOTHESIS 3 (supplementary). Firms are less likely to misstate their financial results if they 
are connected through an audit committee member with firms that previously disclosed 
their own material weakness. 
3. Research design 
Sample 
Because our main objective is to examine whether ICMW disclosures by firms have spillover 
effects on other (connected) firms, we construct our sample around SOX-mandated disclosures 
concerning internal control. SOX has two provisions that require internal control disclosures: 
section 404 requires annual assessments that are certified by an auditor, while section 302 
requires quarterly management assessments. We focus on section 404 disclosures because they 
are auditor-certified and because the annual disclosures are better aligned with director-level data 
available only on an annual basis.5  
5 In unreported tests, we find similar results if we classify a firm as being a material weakness-disclosing firm during 
a year if it reports a material weakness under section 302 in any quarter during the year. 
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Our unit of analysis is a firm-year observation. We obtain annual data on assessments of 
internal control under SOX section 404 and data on financial restatements from Audit Analytics, 
which covers the period from November 2004, the first effective year of section 404, to 
December 2012. We obtain annual data on firms’ boards of directors from the Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS) database. After merging these two datasets, we start with a 
preliminary sample of 14,652 firm-year observations. Because firms can restate their internal 
control reports for a given year, we retain the most recent filing (and drop 611 firm-year 
observations) to ensure that we have the most accurate internal control information for each firm-
year observation. We also eliminate 199 firm-year observations for firms with multiple, non-
consecutive material weakness disclosures (Gordon and Wilford 2012) to avoid confounding 
information from potentially unrelated ICMW disclosures. Finally, we eliminate 4,713 firm-year 
observations with insufficient COMPUSTAT data to calculate various control variables. 
Our final sample consists of 9,129 firm-year observations, including 350 observations of 
ICMW disclosures and 506 reported observations with financial restatements. Because of the 
relatively small proportion of ICMW and restatement observations, we acknowledge that some 
of our analyses may lack power due to a limited number of ICMW and restatement observations. 
Model and variables 
We test our three hypotheses using the following logit regressions. All variables are defined 
in the Appendix. 
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Pr(ICMWij =1) = F(β0 + β1 PDIij + ∑βk Other Variablesij + εij)                        (1)   
 Pr(Misstateij =1) = F(β0 + β1 PDI-Restateij + ∑βk Other Variablesij + εij)            (2) 
 Pr(Misstateij =1) = F(β0 + β1 PDIij + ∑βk Other Variablesjj + εij)              (3) 
Dependent variables 
The dependent variable ICMW in model (1) equals one if sample firm i reports a material 
weakness in year j and zero otherwise. In models (2) and (3), the dependent variable Misstate 
equals one if sample firm i’s financial statements for fiscal year j are restated later in our sample 
period and zero otherwise. 
Independent variables 
For model (1), we test whether the likelihood of disclosing an ICMW is affected by a firm’s 
connection through an audit committee member to another firm that previously disclosed a 
material weakness. We begin by classifying a sample firm as a disclosing firm if it reports an 
ICMW pertaining to period t. We then define a disclosing firm’s post-disclosure period as the 
subsequent three years, t+1 to t+3, and its pre-disclosure period as t–2 to t. We note that in cases 
where the disclosing firm reports an ICMW in consecutive years, the post-disclosure period is 
longer because it would combine the post-disclosure periods for all the weaknesses. For instance, 
if the disclosing firm reports an ICMW in periods t and t+1, the combined post-disclosure period 
would be t+1 to t+4. Thereafter, we refer to other sample firms linked to the disclosing firm as 
connected firms. Formally, we code our main independent variable for model (1), Post 
Disclosure Interlock (PDI hereafter), equal to one if, in a given year j, a sample firm has an audit 
13 
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committee member who concurrently serves on the board of a disclosing firm and year j occurs 
during the disclosing firm’s post-disclosure period. For all other firm-year observations, PDI 
equals zero.  
Figure 1 provides an illustration of how PDI is constructed. Consider the following example. 
Assume Firm A reports a material weakness (ICMW) for 2009 so its post-disclosure period is 
2010–2012. Next, assume that Firm B has an audit committee member who concurrently serves 
on Firm A’s board during the 2010–2012 period. Thus, Firm B is the connected firm. This 
implies that, for Firm B, PDI is coded one in years 2010, 2011, and 2012. For all other years, 
PDI for Firm B is coded zero.6 H1 predicts that β1 < 0; Firm B’s likelihood of reporting an 
ICMW is lower during 2010–2012 than in any other year.  
For model (2), we test whether the likelihood of having a misstatement is affected by a firm’s 
connection through an audit committee member to another firm that previously restated its 
financial statements. Thus, we define the independent variable of interest as PDI-Restate rather 
than PDI (i.e., the disclosing firm is disclosing a financial restatement). H2 predicts that β1 < 0; a 
firm is less likely to have a misstatement that is later restated if it is connected to a firm that 
previously restated its financial statements.  
For model (3), we test whether the likelihood of having a misstatement is affected by a firm’s 
connection through an audit committee member to another firm that previously disclosed an 
ICMW. Thus, we define the dependent variable, Misstate, as in model (2) and the independent 
6 In this example, if the disclosing firm, Firm A, reports an ICMW in years 2008 and 2009, its total post-disclosure 
period would be 2009-2012. Then for the connected firm, Firm B, PDI would be coded one for the years 2009-2012. 
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variable, PDI, as in model (1). H3 predicts that β1 < 0; a firm is less likely to disclose a financial 
restatement if it is connected to a firm that previously disclosed a material control weakness. 
Other independent variables 
We follow prior literature when identifying other independent variables that may affect a 
sample firm’s likelihood of reporting an ICMW. We use the same controls for models (2) and (3) 
because factors that affect the probability of an ICMW disclosure typically also affect the 
likelihood of a misstatement (Abbot et al. 2004; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1991). We organize 
these independent variables into three categories: firm-related characteristics, governance-related 
characteristics, and other controls.   
Firm characteristics. Prior literature suggests that the likelihood of an ICMW disclosure or 
a misstatement is affected by firm size and differences in operating conditions (Ashbaugh-Skaife 
et al. 2008; Doyle et al. 2007; Schrand and Zechman 2012). Firm size is measured as the log of 
market capitalization (Market Cap). Firm age (Firm Age) represents the age of the firm in years. 
Growth is measured as the year-over-year change in firm sales. Loss is included as an indicator 
variable coded one if the firm’s income before extraordinary items is negative in the current or 
prior year and zero otherwise. Reverse Z is measured as the reverse decile ranking of the firm’s 
Altman Z score. Foreign Currency Trans is an indicator variable coded one if the firm has a 
foreign currency translation for the current year and zero otherwise. Restructure is an indicator 
variable coded one if the firm has a restructuring during the year and zero otherwise. We also 
15 
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control for whether a firm issued a restatement of its financial statements within the prior three 
years (Prior Restatement).  
Governance characteristics. We control for various characteristics of boards and audit 
committees because prior literature suggests that corporate governance plays an important 
monitoring role, which could affect the likelihood of an ICMW disclosure or a misstatement 
(Abbot et al. 2004; Krishnan 2005; Vafeas 2005). In particular, we control for the presence of 
independent directors (Percent Outsiders), the size of the board (Board Size), the size of the 
audit committee of the board (AC Size), the total number of directorships held by audit 
committee members (AC Directorship), recent auditor changes (Auditor Change), and whether 
the firm employs a Big 4 auditor (Big 4). 
 Other controls. Because H1 – H3 rely on the argument that board networks are a primary 
source of information and insights about control practices and events surrounding financial 
restatements, we control for the possibility that other inter-firm connections are important 
sources of information as well (Haunschild and Beckman 1998). For example, we consider the 
possibility that firms that operate in the same industry likely employ similar control practices and 
face comparable control problems. Accordingly, we include Post-Disclosure Link–Industry, an 
indicator variable that equals one if a firm shares a 4-digit SIC industry with a disclosing firm 
during the disclosing firm’s post-disclosure period. We also consider the possibility that firms 
absorb insights concerning an ICMW disclosure or a financial restatement via a shared auditor. 
We control for auditor links via an indicator variable, Post-Disclosure Link–Auditor, which takes 
16 
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the value of one if a firm shares a common audit office with a disclosing firm during the 
disclosing firm’s post-disclosure period. We focus on links through audit offices because Lennox 
and Li (2014) suggest that the audit office is a more likely mechanism for information spillover. 
For model (1), Post-Disclosure Link–Industry and Post-Disclosure Link–Auditor are calculated 
based on connections to a firm that previously disclosed an ICMW, while in models (2) and (3), 
these variables are based on connections to a firm that previously disclosed a financial 
restatement. 
We also include Total Interlocks, measured as the number of other firms a sample firm is 
connected with through shared directors, to control for the possibility that firms linked with more 
firms may be more likely to be connected to a firm that previously disclosed an ICMW (or a 
restatement). Finally, we control for industry (SIC 2-digit) and year fixed effects and calculate 
standard errors in all our tests by clustering at the firm level. The marginal effect of the 
coefficients is presented in each model.  
Descriptive statistics  
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our sample. Panel A shows that ICMW has a mean 
of 3.8 percent, which translates to 350 firm-year observations with ICMW disclosures. 
Correspondingly, Misstate is 5.5 percent of the sample firm-year observations, which translates 
to 506 misstatements. These percentages are lower than in prior internal control and financial 
restatement studies because our sample requires director-related data from ISS which covers 
17 
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larger firms that tend to report fewer ICMW (Doyle et al. 2007) and restatements.7 Consistent 
with ISS’s focus on larger firms, 94 percent of firms in our sample are audited by the Big 4, and 
the median firm-year in our sample has a market capitalization of $2.1 billion, a figure 
significantly larger than the median COMPUSTAT firm in our sample period, which is about 
$200 million. 
Table 1, panel A shows that 9.5 percent of our sample has an audit committee member who 
also serves on the board of an ICMW-disclosing firm during its post-disclosure period (i.e., PDI 
= 1) and that PDI-Restate has a mean of 15.8 percent.  
Table 1, panel B reveals that ICMW and PDI are significantly negatively correlated, which 
provides preliminary support for H1 that connecting directors with prior ICMW disclosure 
experience reduce the probability of reporting an ICMW. Similarly, Table 1, panel B reveals that 
Misstate and PDI-Restate are negatively correlated, which provides initial support for H2. In 
contrast, there is no preliminary evidence to support H3; Misstate and PDI are not correlated at 
the univariate level. 
4. Results 
Main results 
Table 2 presents the results of estimating models (1) – (3). The coefficients represent the 
marginal effects of each variable included in the logit regressions. In column 1, where ICMW is 
the dependent variable, PDI is negative and statistically significant (z-stat: –2.14). This supports 
7 Before imposing the requirement that the sample observations have director-related data from ISS, ICMW 
disclosures are 6.9 percent of the sample drawn from Audit Analytics. This is comparable with the 6.7 percent and 
8.8 percent figures reported in Gordon and Wilford (2012) and Klam et al. (2012).  
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H1 and implies that, for the average sample firm, a board connection reduces the likelihood of 
reporting an ICMW by 0.9 percent. Given a sample-wide average ICMW probability of 3.8 
percent, a 0.9 percent reduction (to 2.9 percent) represents compelling evidence that ICMW 
disclosures under the mandatory provisions of SOX generate a significant spillover on connected 
firms.8  
Table 2, column 1 shows that other inter-firm connections, such as operating in the same 
industry or sharing an auditor, have no discernable effects on the likelihood of reporting an 
ICMW. The absence of an auditor effect suggests that auditors are not a mechanism for 
transmission of information about internal controls. In turn, the absence of an industry effect 
implies that merely operating in the same industry is not sufficient to affect the internal controls 
of connected firms, even though firms operating in the same industry often confront similar 
internal control issues.9 Lastly, we note that the significance of the coefficients on many of the 
firm- and governance-related variables in column 1 are consistent with those found in prior 
internal control studies (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008; Doyle et al. 2007). 
In Table 2, column 2, we present the results for model (2). When Misstate is the dependent 
variable, PDI-Restate is negative and statistically significant (z-stat: –1.96). This supports our 
8 Our independent variable PDI is based on the assumption that an audit committee member of a connected firm is 
best positioned to initiate the spillover. In untabulated results, we calculate an alternative interlock variable where 
the connecting director is not on the audit committee of the connected firm. We find that if a connecting director is 
not on the audit committee, then he/she has no discernable effect on a connected firm’s likelihood of reporting an 
ICMW. 
9 We also consider the impact of inter-firm connections that arise because a disclosing firm and a focal firm belong 
to the same corporate group (e.g., have the same parent company or ultimate parent company). In unreported tests, 
we find our results are unaffected if we exclude 63 firm-year observations where such inter-firm connections are 
present.  
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second hypothesis and implies that, for the average sample firm, a board connection reduces the 
likelihood of reporting a financial restatement by 0.9 percent.  
Taken together, the results in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 suggest that connecting directors 
with prior ICMW disclosure or financial restatement experience use that experience to influence 
their firms’ behaviors. However, as noted in section 2, directors’ influence on firms can manifest 
in two ways. For instance, it can be argued that connecting directors have a positive influence on 
firms because they bring valuable information to the audit committee and improve their firms’ 
internal control and financial reporting practices. But it is also possible that connecting directors 
use their experience superficially and ensure that firms under-report their shortcomings without 
any attendant improvements in underlying practices. Unfortunately, because we observe control 
weaknesses and misstatements only when firms publicly disclose them, we cannot empirically 
distinguish whether the spillover is superficial or has a real positive effect on firm practices. 
In column 3 of Table 2, we present the results for model (3). With Misstate as the dependent 
variable, PDI is negative but insignificant (z-stat: –0.21). If we interpret H1 to suggest that 
connecting directors use their prior ICMW disclosure experience to improve their firms’ internal 
controls, then we would expect financial reporting quality to improve eventually as well. The 
insignificant coefficient for PDI in model (3) implies that director connections to ICMW-
disclosing firms have no effect on financial reporting quality, at least as measured by the 
likelihood of financial restatements. The insignificant coefficient for PDI also implies that 
connecting directors do not use their prior ICMW disclosure experience to under-report financial 
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restatements. However, the statistically insignificant coefficient could also be attributed to a lack 
of power in the test because there are only 40 observations where PDI and Misstate both equal 
one.  
Taken together, the findings of this section suggest that public disclosure of adverse practices 
or events generates a spillover for connected firms. Specifically, we provide evidence in support 
of our first hypothesis that one firm’s material weakness disclosure under section 404 deters a 
similar future disclosure at a connected firm, but that this effect occurs only when the connection 
is through an audit committee member. Moreover, while our focus is on the spillover effects of 
ICMW disclosures, evidence of a comparable spillover when the public disclosure is about 
financial restatements hints at a more general finding: Public disclosures of a broad class of 
adverse events can have a deterrence effect on other firms. Although we suspect these are 
positive spillovers due to improvements in firms’ internal control and financial reporting 
practices, we acknowledge that the spillover may be superficial in the sense that control 
weaknesses and financial restatements are under-reported. 
Cross-sectional tests  
In this section, we conduct two cross-sectional tests to identify conditions under which 
spillovers from ICMW disclosures are more clearly evident. We organize our tests along two 
dimensions: (i) the strength of a connecting director’s experience at the disclosing firm, and (ii) 
the magnitude of information about the underlying weakness that a connecting director can 
potentially convey.  
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Strength of connecting director’s experience 
Our first hypothesis is based on the assumption that connecting directors convey information 
and insights about their ICMW experiences to connected firms. Therefore, we expect the 
spillover to be more clearly evident when a connecting director’s experience at the disclosing 
firm allows him/her to more fully witness and internalize the events surrounding the disclosure. 
We measure the strength of a connecting director’s experience in three ways: the director’s 
incumbency on the disclosing firm’s board, the director’s service on the disclosing firm’s audit 
committee, and the director’s experience with remediation at the disclosing firm. 
We label a connecting director as an incumbent if that director was on the board of the 
disclosing firm before the disclosure. Because an incumbent connecting director at the disclosing 
firm would have experienced the circumstances leading up to the disclosure, the disclosure itself, 
and the potential remediation efforts, we expect such a connecting director to have salient 
insights about the entire sequence of events surrounding the disclosure that can be readily 
conveyed to the connected firm’s audit committee. Hence, we predict that spillovers are more 
clearly evident when a connecting director is an incumbent director on the disclosing firm’s 
board rather than a director appointed after the disclosure.  
Our second measure of a connecting director’s experience is service on the disclosing firm’s 
audit committee. Because the audit committee handles the fallout of the ICMW disclosure, we 
expect service on the disclosing firm’s audit committee provides a director more firsthand 
information about the consequences and/or remediation efforts of the disclosing firm, which can 
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be conveyed to and used by the connected firm. Hence, we expect spillovers to be more clearly 
evident when connecting directors serve on the disclosing firm’s audit committee. Our third 
proxy, whether ICMWs have been remedied, assumes that a director who experiences the 
remediation efforts at a disclosing firm has more insights about how to improve and maintain 
effective internal controls as well as more information about the costs of such remediation 
efforts.  
We measure incumbency by subdividing the PDI variable into two mutually exclusive 
variables based on whether the connecting director was an incumbent on the disclosing firm’s 
board before the ICMW disclosure. PDI-Incumbent (New) equals one if PDI equals one and the 
connecting director joined the board of the disclosing firm before (after) the disclosing firm’s 
disclosure. Thus, the connecting director for PDI-Incumbent is on the disclosing firm’s board 
before and after the disclosure while the director for PDI-New joined the disclosing firm after the 
disclosure.10 To examine the effect of a director’s service on a disclosing firm’s audit committee, 
we decompose PDI into two variables: PDI-(Non) AC is coded one if PDI equals one and the 
connecting director is (not) an audit committee member at the disclosing firm. For our sample 
firms, we assume remediation to have occurred if a firm reports an ICMW one year but does not 
report an ICMW in the subsequent year. We then decompose PDI into two mutually exclusive 
10 For an illustration, consider Figure 1 where an audit committee member of Firm B is concurrently connected to an 
ICMW-disclosing Firm A in years 2010 through 2012. If we assume that the connecting director has also been on 
Firm A’s board since at least 2009, then for Firm B, PDI-Incumbent would be coded one for years 2010, 2011, and 
2012, respectively. However, if we assume that the connecting director joined Firm A’s board after 2010, then PDI-
Incumbent would be coded zero and PDI-New would be coded one for years 2010-2012. 
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variables based on whether the disclosing firm remedied its ICMWs: PDI-(Non) Remediation is 
equal to one if PDI equals one and the disclosing firm has (not) remedied its ICMWs. 
Table 3 provides preliminary evidence of the PDI decomposition. Whereas 9.5 percent of the 
sample where PDI equals one are reported earlier in Table 1, 8.1 percent are incumbent directors 
on the disclosing firms’ boards (PDI-Incumbent), 5.4 percent are directors who serve on the 
disclosing firm audit committee (PDI-AC), and 7.9 percent of directors have experienced 
remediation at the disclosing firm (PDI-Remediation). Importantly, we note that all three 
measures of the strength of a connecting director’s experience are associated with fewer 
incidences of ICMW, which provides preliminary evidence that the spillover is more evident 
when a connecting director has more relevant experience with the disclosing firm.  
Table 4 provides formal tests of the effects of a connecting director’s experience. In column 
1, we find that PDI-Incumbent has a negative and significant coefficient (z-stat: –3.25) while 
PDI-New is statistically insignificant. In column 2, we find that PDI-AC has a negative and 
significant coefficient (z-stat: –2.48) while PDI-Non AC has an insignificant coefficient. In 
column 3, PDI-Remediation (z-stat: –2.50) is negative and significant and PDI-Non Remediation 
is statistically insignificant. Taken together, these results suggest that the spillover is more 
clearly evident when the connecting director has comprehensive experience with the disclosing 
firm. 
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Magnitude of ICMW information  
If connecting directors convey information and insights about their ICMW disclosure 
experiences to connected firms, then we expect spillovers to be more clearly evident when the 
information conveyed about the underlying ICMW is more substantial.11 We consider the 
pervasive nature of the disclosed ICMW as a proxy for the magnitude of the information. 
Pervasive ICMWs pertain to a firm’s overall internal control environment or susceptibility to 
management override and they are more substantive and harder to remedy (Goh 2009). 
Following prior literature, we classify such ICMWs as “entity-wide” using descriptions provided 
by Audit Analytics (Bedard et al. 2012). We then decompose PDI into two mutually exclusive 
variables, PDI Entity Weakness and PDI Non-Entity Weakness, based on whether the disclosing 
firm’s ICMW is classified as entity-wide.  
As shown in Table 3, the mean of PDI Entity Weakness is 4.3 percent and is generally 
associated with fewer incidences of ICMW. This is consistent with our expectation that the 
magnitude of information available about the underlying weakness has an important effect on the 
connected firm’s disclosures.  
In Table 4, column 4, the coefficient on PDI Entity Weakness is negative and significant (z-
stat: –4.71) while the coefficient on PDI-Non Entity Weakness is insignificant. This provides 
evidence that the spillover is more evident when the information conveyed about the underlying 
weakness is more substantial. 
11 As in H1 and H2, there are two reasons a spillover might manifest in this test: knowledge of the substance of the 
underlying ICMW can spur the connected firm to improve its internal controls, or sway the firm to under-report its 
ICMWs. 
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5. Additional analysis 
In this section, we provide a number of additional tests and sensitivity analyses to illustrate 
the robustness of our results and address concerns about alternative interpretations. 
Director quality  
An important alternative explanation for our finding that PDI is negatively associated with 
ICMW disclosures rests on the argument that PDI measures the inherent high quality of 
connecting directors rather than their information and insights from prior experiences. We 
address this concern several ways. 
First, we note that our main finding of a negative association between ICMW and PDI in 
Table 2 is conditional on a commonly used indicator of director quality, AC Directorships (e.g., 
Fama and Jensen 1983). Although PDI and AC Directorships are positively associated at the 
univariate level (Table 1, panel B), the effect of PDI on ICMW in Table 2 is clearly incremental 
to director quality.  
Second, we control for the presence of an individual high-quality director on the audit 
committee of a sample firm.12 We code High Quality Director equal to one if the sample firm 
has an audit committee member whose total number of board seats is above the sample median 
of all directors in the sample and zero otherwise. In Table 5, column 1, we show that PDI retains 
its negative coefficient while the coefficient on High Quality Director is statistically 
insignificant. Hence, to the extent that the number of board appointments held by a director is a 
12 In contrast, AC Directorships measures the total number of board seats held by all audit committee members of a 
sample firm. 
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reasonable indicator of his/her quality, the evidence again suggests that the effect of PDI on 
ICMW is capturing an effect beyond quality. 
Finally, we focus on the subsample of observations without director turnover to mitigate the 
concern that PDI merely proxies for director quality. If firms systematically replace low-quality 
directors with high-quality ones, then the variation in director quality in the no-turnover sample 
should be minimal. Hence, to the extent that PDI retains its association with ICMW, it alleviates 
the concern that the association is due to PDI serving as a proxy for director quality.13 We 
therefore rerun model (1) on the no-turnover subsample. In Table 5, column 2, we continue to 
find that PDI retains a negative and significant coefficient at the 5 percent level which again 
implies that the effect of PDI on ICMW is capturing an effect beyond quality. 
Altogether, our sensitivity tests in this section help mitigate the concern that PDI measures 
the inherent high quality of connecting directors rather than their information and insights from 
prior experiences. However, because director quality is not observable in all its dimensions, we 
acknowledge that our tests may not fully disentangle the effect of director quality on PDI. 
Director selection  
Our results are also susceptible to the concern that “director selection” or matching of 
directors with firms explains our findings. For instance, if firms appoint directors with prior 
material weakness experience as a precaution, or if directors with prior material weakness 
experience only seek future board appointments at firms with strong internal controls, then our 
13 The (in)significant coefficient on PDI-(New)-Incumbent in Table 4 also helps to address the concern that firms 
systematically replace low-quality directors with newer, higher quality ones by showing that our findings are only 
attributable to incumbent directors of the disclosing firm, and not to new ones. 
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finding of a negative association between PDI and ICMW may be attributed to director selection 
rather than directors’ prior experiences with ICMW disclosures. One way we address this issue is 
to redefine PDI to exclude post-ICMW disclosure board appointments that may be most affected 
by director selection concerns. In particular, we define PDI-Alternative equal to one if PDI 
equals one and the connecting director was on the board of the connected firm before the 
disclosing firm’s disclosure. Table 6, panel A presents our results. Consistent with our finding in 
Table 2 column 1, we find that PDI-Alternative is significantly negative (t-stat: –2.40). Hence, 
we suggest that director selection is unlikely to be a major concern. 
We also present additional evidence about director selection by examining how directors’ 
prior experiences with ICMW disclosures affect their probability of new board appointments. 
Specifically, we define New Dir equal to one if an audit committee director is appointed to a new 
board in a given year and zero otherwise and let Post Disclosure indicate if the director 
experienced an ICMW in the prior three years at any of his/her directorships. In Table 6, panel B, 
we present a regression of New Dir on Post Disclosure controlling for director age, number of 
directorships, the average firm performance (stock returns) of the director’s other appointments 
and various other controls. We find that Post Disclosure has a negative and significant 
coefficient at the 1 percent level, suggesting that firms are less likely to appoint a director once 
that director becomes associated with an ICMW disclosure. More importantly, the evidence 
counters director selection concerns because it shows that firms tend to avoid rather than seek 
directors with prior ICMW disclosure experience. 
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Other sensitivity tests  
In this section, we conduct a number of additional sensitivity tests to address the robustness 
of our results for model (1). First, we repeat our main test but drop a firm from the analysis after 
it reports an ICMW. This reduces the number of observations and controls for the fact that firms 
tend to remedy their ICMWs shortly after the disclosure. The results presented in Table 7, 
column 1 confirm our main finding in Table 2, column 1.  
Second, we examine whether the likelihood of reporting an ICMW depends on the passage of 
time in some way. For instance, we note a steady decrease in the instances of ICMW disclosures 
during our sample period. We use a discrete-time logistic model which estimates the probability 
that a firm reports a material weakness in time t, given that it has not yet reported one thus far 
(Allison 1984). We use the same modified dependent variable used in column 1. The results, 
presented in column 2 of Table 7, suggest the PDI coefficient is negative and statistically 
significant (z-stat: –2.85), consistent with our main finding in Table 2.  
Third, we test our model (1) on two subsamples, 2004–2007 and 2008–2012, to address 
concerns that firms reported more weaknesses in the earlier years than in later years of our 
sample period (Gordon and Wilford 2012). We choose 2007 as the cutoff year because the 
biggest decline in ICMW disclosures in our sample occurs in 2007 and because 2007 is 
approximately the midpoint of our sample period. Table 7, columns 3 and 4 present this test. 
Consistent with the results in Table 2, column 1, we find that PDI has a negative and statistically 
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significant coefficient for both subsamples, indicating that the timing of firms’ ICMW 
disclosures during the sample period does not affect our results.  
Fourth, we consider an alternative definition of how firms are connected to an ICMW-
disclosing firm. Instead of PDI, we use the number of links to a disclosing firm by a connecting 
director scaled by total interlocks to control for the possibility that the relative amount of internal 
control information could impact the firm’s decision making. The results reported in Table 7 
column 5 suggest that our results are robust to this alternative measure.14  
Reconciling with prior studies 
Our finding that the public disclosure of an ICMW (or financial restatement) has the potential 
to create a positive spillover stands in contrast with other papers that document a negative 
spillover from board connections. For example, Chiu et al. (2013) find that firms are more likely 
to engage in aggressive financial reporting if they share a director with a firm that also engages 
in aggressive financial reporting, and Bizjack et al. (2009) find that option backdating spreads 
among firms with shared directors. Although both of these studies show that negative practices 
spread between connected firms, in both cases, the studied behavior is privately observed.  
An important feature of our setting is the public nature of ICMW disclosures. We argue that 
public disclosures of negative practices reduce the chances of imitation and likely serve as a 
deterrent. In particular, we argue that when the consequences and potential remedies of ICMW 
14 We also create an interlock variable that excludes year one from the post-disclosure period. In unreported tests, 
defining PDI for only years two and three of the post-disclosure period does not affect our results. We also create 
three separate PDI variables for each year of the post-disclosure period. In unreported tests, we find that the PDI 
variable for years one and two are statistically insignificant, but that the PDI for year three is negative and 
statistically significant. 
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disclosures become apparent, the cost-benefit tradeoff likely shifts in favor of improving internal 
controls. Thus, a fundamental difference between our setting and the settings of Chiu et al. 
(2013) and Bizjack et al. (2009) is the public nature of the disclosure.  
To bolster our argument that the public nature of an ICMW disclosure is what drives the 
spillover, we revisit our test of model (1) but with board connections that are present in an 
ICMW disclosing firm’s pre-disclosure period, a period that is more akin to the non-public 
settings of Chiu et al. (2013) and Bizjack et al. (2009). We set an indicator variable Pre-
Disclosure Interlock equal to one if a firm has an audit committee member who concurrently 
serves on the board of another firm during that firm’s pre-disclosure period. Thus unlike PDI in 
Table 2, column 1, Pre-Disclosure Interlock reflects board connections with a firm whose 
internal controls are weak but yet to be acknowledged as such publicly. Table 8 provides the 
results. Consistent with prior findings of negative contagion, we find that the coefficient on Pre-
Disclosure Interlock is significantly positive at the 1 percent level. This reconciles our results 
with prior contagion studies and suggests that weak control practices are contagious when the 
costs, consequences and potential remedies of ICMW disclosures are not readily apparent.  
6. Conclusion 
We find that firms are less likely to disclose internal control material weaknesses if they are 
connected, through an audit committee member, to a firm that previously disclosed its own 
internal control material weakness. We find a similar spillover effect for financial restatements. 
We focus on shared directors who are audit committee members because board members are 
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privy to information and insights within their board networks and because audit committee 
members are specifically charged with overseeing internal controls and financial reporting. Our 
findings underscore the importance of audit committees in shaping firms’ internal control and 
financial reporting practices. In contrast to connecting audit committee directors, we find no 
evidence that other inter-firm connections (e.g., having the same auditors or operating in the 
same industry) have similar effects. 
We also find that a connected firm’s lower likelihood of disclosing an internal control 
material weakness is evident only when the connecting director has relevant experience with the 
weakness-disclosing firm and/or when the director has substantial information about the 
underlying control weakness. For example, we find that the likelihood of disclosing an internal 
control material weakness is lower only when the connecting director is an incumbent director on 
the disclosing firm’s board, serves on the disclosing firm’s audit committee, or when the 
disclosed material weakness is considered pervasive.     
Our findings suggest that directors’ experiences with other firms are an important source of 
information about the costs of operating with weak internal controls and/or having low-quality 
financial reporting as well as the potential benefits of remedying such practices. One 
interpretation is that directors use this information constructively to improve their firms’ internal 
control practices and financial reporting quality. This highlights the importance of public 
disclosures such as SOX as a source of positive spillovers, a benefit of SOX that has not been 
well recognized in the literature. However, because firms’ control practices or the quality of their 
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financial reporting are not directly observable, an alternative interpretation holds that directors 
use their prior experiences to ensure that firms under-report their deficiencies to the public. 
Hence, a fruitful avenue for future research would be to better understand circumstances where 
mandated public disclosures encourage more misreporting or where such disclosures serve as a 
deterrent for others and generate positive spillovers.  
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Figure 1: Post-Disclosure Interlock 
     Disclosing Firm 
        
Pre-Disclosure Period 
 
 
Post-Disclosure Period 
       
 
     
 
  
  
 
    
 
  
  
t–2 t–1 t           t+1         t+2         t+3 
Connected firm PDI=0 PDI=0 PDI=0 PDI=0/1 PDI=0/1 PDI=0/1 
A disclosing firm discloses an internal control material weakness pertaining to year t, which makes its post-
disclosure period year t+1, t+2, and t+3. A connected firm is any sample firm that is connected to the disclosing 
firm through an audit committee member during the disclosing firm’s post-disclosure period. PDI equals one if a 
connected firm’s audit committee member concurrently serves on the disclosing firm’s board in a year that is during 
the disclosing firm’s post-disclosure period (t+1, t+2, and t+3). In the post-disclosure period, a connection between 
the connected and disclosing firms would make PDI equal one. If there is no connection in the post-disclosure 
period between the two firms, PDI equals zero. 
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Appendix  
Variable definitions 
Variable  Definition 
ICMW Coded one if the firm reported a material weakness under SOX 404 and zero 
otherwise. 
Misstate Coded one if a firm’s current year financial reports are later restated during the 
sample period and zero otherwise.  
PDI Coded one if a firm in year j has an audit committee member who concurrently 
serves on the board of a disclosing firm in a year that is during the disclosing firm’s 
post-disclosure period; coded zero otherwise. The post-disclosure period is defined 
as the three-year period following the disclosing firm’s ICMW disclosure. 
PDI-Restate Coded one if a firm in year j has an audit committee member who concurrently 
serves on the board of a disclosing firm that restated its financial statements in a year 
that is during the disclosing firm’s post-disclosure period; coded zero otherwise. The 
post-disclosure period is defined as the three-year period following the disclosing 
firm’s restatement disclosure. 
PDI-Incumbent  
(PDI-New) 
Coded one if a firm in year j has an audit committee member who (i) concurrently 
serves on the board of a disclosing firm in a year that is during the disclosing firm’s 
post-disclosure period and (ii) joined the disclosing firm’s board before (after) the 
time of its ICMW disclosure; coded zero otherwise. 
PDI-AC  
(PDI-Non AC) 
Coded one if a firm in year j has an audit committee member who concurrently 
serves on the audit committee of the board of a disclosing firm in a year that is 
during the disclosing firm’s post-disclosure period; coded zero otherwise. PDI-Non 
AC is coded one if a sample firm in year j has an audit committee member who 
concurrently serves on the board (but not on the audit committee) of a disclosing 
firm in a year that is during the disclosing firm’s post-disclosure period; coded zero 
otherwise.  
PDI-Remediation            
(PDI-Non Remediation) 
Coded one if a firm in year j has an audit committee member who (i) concurrently 
serves on the board of a disclosing firm in a year that is during the disclosing firm’s 
post-disclosure period and (ii) the disclosing firm remediated (did not remediate) its 
weakness; coded zero otherwise. 
PDI Entity Weakness 
(PDI Non-Entity Weakness) 
Coded one if a firm in year j has an audit committee member who (i) concurrently 
serves on the board of a disclosing firm in a year that is during the disclosing firm’s 
post-disclosure period and (ii) the disclosing firm’s material weakness is (not) 
classified an entity-wide weakness; coded zero otherwise. 
PDI-Alternative Coded one if a firm in year j has an audit committee member who (i) concurrently 
serves on the board of a disclosing firm in a year that is during the disclosing firm’s 
post-disclosure period and (ii) was on the connected firm’s board before the 
disclosing firm’s ICMW disclosure; coded zero otherwise.  
Market Cap Log of market capitalization. 
Firm Age Age of the firm. 
Loss Coded one if the income before extraordinary items is less than zero in the current 
year.  
Reverse Z Reverse decile rankings of the Altman Z Score, which is calculated following 
Altman (1968): 1.2*(Working Capital/Assets) +1.4*(Retained Earnings/Assets) + 
3.3*(Earnings Before Income and Taxes/Assets) +.6*(Market Value of 
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Equity/Assets) + .99*(Sales/Assets). 
Growth The difference between sales in year t and t–1 scaled by sales in t–1. 
Foreign Currency Trans Coded one if the firm had a foreign currency translation in the current year and zero 
otherwise.   
Restructure Coded one if the firm had a restructuring in the current year and zero otherwise. 
Prior Restatement Coded one if the firm issued a restatement of its financial statements in the prior 
three years and zero otherwise. 
Percent Outsiders Percentage of the independent directors on the board. 
Board Size The log of board size. 
AC Size The log of audit committee size. 
AC Directorships The log of one plus the total number of directorships held by audit committee 
members.  
Auditor Change Coded one if the firm had an audit change in the current year and zero otherwise. 
Big 4  Coded one if the firm had a Big 4 Auditor in the current year and zero otherwise. 
Post-Disclosure Link – 
Industry 
Coded one if the firm shares an industry (SIC 4-digit) with a disclosing firm in a year 
that is during the disclosing firm’s post-disclosure period and zero otherwise. When 
ICMW (Misstate) is the dependent variable, the disclosing firm for this variable 
previously disclosed a material weakness (restatement). 
Post-Disclosure Link – 
Auditor 
Coded one if the firm shares a common audit office with a disclosing firm in a year 
that is during the disclosing firm’s post-disclosure period and zero otherwise. When 
ICMW (Misstate) is the dependent variable, the disclosing firm for this variable 
previously disclosed a material weakness (restatement). 
Total Interlocks The log of one plus the total interlocks where an interlock is the total number of 
other firms a firm is connected with through a shared director. 
High Quality Director Coded one if the firm has an audit committee member whose total number of board 
seats is above the sample median of total board seats for all directors in the sample; 
coded zero otherwise.  
Pre-Disclosure Interlock Coded one if a firm has an audit committee member who concurrently serves on the 
board of a disclosing firm in a year that is during that firm’s pre-disclosure period, 
which is defined as the three-year period leading up to the disclosing firm’s ICMW 
disclosure; coded zero otherwise. 
Pre-Disclosure Link 
Industry 
Coded one if a firm shares an industry (SIC 4-digit) with a disclosing firm in a year 
that is during that firm’s pre-disclosure period; coded zero otherwise. 
Pre-Disclosure Link Auditor Coded one if a firm shares a common audit office with a disclosing firm in a year 
that is during that firm’s pre-disclosure period; coded zero otherwise. 
New Dir Coded one if the director received a new appointment in a given year and zero 
otherwise. This variable is used in the director selection model of Table 6B. 
Post Disclosure Coded one if the director experienced an ICMW disclosure in the past three years at 
any of his/her firms; coded zero otherwise. This variable is used in the director 
selection model of Table 6 panel B. 
Similar Size Coded one if the director sits on the board of a firm in the same size decile as the 
prospective new firm; coded zero otherwise. This variable is used in the director 
selection model of Table 6 panel B. 
Same Industry Coded one if the director sits on a board of a firm in the same industry as the 
prospective new firm; coded zero otherwise. This variable is used in the director 
selection model of Table 6 panel B. 
Same Region Coded one if the director sits on a board of a firm in the same region as the 
prospective new firm; coded zero otherwise. This variable is used in the director 
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selection model of Table 6 panel B. 
Age Age of the director. This variable is used in the director selection model of Table 6 
panel B. 
Avg Perf The average stock return of all of the director’s firms. This variable is used in the 
director selection model of Table 6 panel B. 
Directorships Number of board seats held by the director. This variable is used in the director 
selection model of Table 6 panel B. 
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 Table 1: Descriptive statistics     Panel A: Dependent and independent variables    Variable Mean P 25 P 50 P 75 
Dependent variables      ICMW 0.038 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Misstated 0.054 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Independent variables         
Post-Disclosure Interlock (PDI) 0.095 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PDI-Restate 0.158 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Firm characteristics 
    Market Cap 7.809 6.735 7.671 8.743 
Age 26.741 12.000 20.000 38.000 
Loss  0.180 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ReverseZ 3.684 2.000 3.000 5.000 
Foreign Currency Trans 0.351 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Restructure 0.400 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Growth 0.097 0.000 0.079 0.169 
Prior Restatement  0.120 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Governance characteristics 
    Percent Outsiders 0.768 0.700 0.800 0.875 
Board Size  9.148 8.000 9.000 11.000 
AC Size  3.728 3.000 4.000 4.000 
AC Directorships  5.594 4.000 5.000 7.000 
Auditor Change 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Big 4  0.943 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Other controls 
    Post-Disclosure Link Auditor 0.371 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Post-Disclosure Link Industry 0.328 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Total Interlocks 4.408 1.000 3.000 6.000 
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Panel B: Correlation of selected variables 
             Market Prior  Percent 
  ICMW Misstate PDI PDI-Restate Cap Restatement Outsiders 
Misstate 0.266*** 
      PDI -0.035*** -0.013 
     PDI-Restate -0.044*** -0.043*** 0.469*** 
    Market Cap -0.104*** -0.069*** 0.069*** 0.134*** 
   Prior Restatement 0.071*** -0.080*** 0.017 0.022** -0.085*** 
  Percent Outsiders -0.052*** -0.082*** 0.069*** 0.117*** 0.167*** 0.050*** 
 AC Directorships -0.059*** -0.043*** 0.247*** 0.351*** 0.399*** -0.045*** 0.287*** 
Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the variables included in our main analysis. Board Size, AC Size, and AC 
Directorships are not log transformed in Panel A. Panel B provides the correlations among the main variables. ** 
and *** represent significance at the 5 percent and 1 percent levels using a two-tailed test. Variables are defined in 
the Appendix.
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Table 2: Effect of interlock with disclosing firm 
     (1)  (2)  (3) 
Variables Prediction ICMW Misstate Misstate 
PDI  - -0.009** 
 
-0.001 
  
(-2.141) 
 
(-0.210) 
PDI-Restate - 
 
-0.009** 
 
   
(-1.961) 
 Firm characteristics 
    Market Cap 
 
-0.007*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
  
(-5.805) (-2.940) (-2.957) 
Age 
 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  
(-0.356) (-1.533) (-1.096) 
Loss 
 
0.006 0.005 0.005 
  
(1.498) (0.907) (0.903) 
ReverseZ 
 
0.002*** 0.002 0.002* 
  
(2.738) (1.551) (1.682) 
Foreign Currency Trans 
 
0.012*** 0.003 0.004 
  
(3.300) (0.759) (0.908) 
Restructure 
 
0.007** 0.005 0.004 
  
(2.429) (1.231) (0.962) 
Growth 
 
-0.004 -0.002 -0.002 
  
(-0.937) (-0.605) (-0.324) 
Prior Restatement 
 
0.027*** -0.037*** -0.037*** 
  
(3.849) (-9.807) (-10.359) 
Governance 
    Percent Outsiders 
 
0.004 -0.021 -0.019 
  
(0.426) (-1.335) (-1.271) 
Board Size 
 
0.007 -0.011 -0.017 
  
(0.901) (-0.977) (-1.392) 
AC Size 
 
-0.002 -0.010 -0.002 
  
(-0.186) (-0.720) (-0.165) 
AC Directorships 
 
-0.001 0.008 0.003 
  
(-0.138) (0.733) (0.267) 
Auditor Change 
 
0.017** 0.021*** 0.021*** 
  
(1.964) (4.432) (4.341) 
Big4 
 
0.001 0.015 0.016 
  
(0.325) (1.385) (1.414) 
Other links 
    Post-Disclosure Link – Auditor 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 
  
(0.131) (-0.682) (-0.324) 
Post-Disclosure Link – Industry 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 
  
(0.000) (-0.746) (-0.845) 
Total Interlocks 
 
-0.003 -0.004 -0.004 
  
(-1.056) (-0.908) (-0.922) 
Industry and Year FE 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
     Observations 
 
9,129 9,129 9,129 
Pseudo R2  0.185 0.130 0.149 
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This table presents a logit regression for models (1) - (3). The dependent variable in column 1 is ICMW, which is 
coded one if the firm reports a material weakness under SOX 404 and zero otherwise. In columns 2 and 3, the 
dependent variable is Misstate, coded one if the firm’s current year reports are later restated and coded zero 
otherwise. The independent variable in columns 1 and 3 is PDI, which is coded one if a firm in year j has an audit 
committee member who concurrently serves on the board of a disclosing firm in a year that is during the disclosing 
firm’s post-disclosure period; coded zero otherwise. The post-disclosure period is defined as the three-year period 
following the disclosing firm’s material weakness (ICMW) disclosure. The independent variable in column 2 is 
PDI-Restate, which is coded one if a firm in year j has an audit committee member who concurrently serves on the 
board of a firm that disclosed a restatement of its financial statements in a year that is during its three-year post-
disclosure period. All other variables are defined in the Appendix. The table presents the marginal effects and z-
statistics (in parentheses) of each variable. Industry and year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered 
by firm. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels using a two-tailed 
test. 
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Table 3: Alternate PDI variables and ICMW disclosures 
 Interlock variables Mean ICMW=1 ICMW=0 Difference  
Strength of experience 
     PDI-Incumbent 0.081 0.034 0.082 -0.048 *** 
PDI-New 0.014 0.009 0.014 -0.005 
 PDI-AC 0.054 0.023 0.055 -0.033 *** 
PDI-Non AC 0.041 0.020 0.041 -0.021 ** 
PDI-Remediation 0.079 0.029 0.081 -0.053 *** 
PDI-Non Remediation 0.016 0.014 0.015 -0.001  
Magnitude of information about weakness 
PDI Entity Weakness 0.043 0.009 0.044 -0.035 *** 
PDI Non-Entity Weakness 0.052 0.034 0.053 -0.019 * 
This table provides the mean of each alternate version of PDI used in the cross-sectional analysis and also compares 
the mean of each PDI variable for observations with a material weakness (ICMW=1) and without a material 
weakness (ICMW=0). The variables are defined in the Appendix. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10 
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels using a two-tailed test. 
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Table 4: Cross-sectional analysis 
         (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
Variable Prediction ICMW ICMW ICMW ICMW 
PDI-Incumbent - -0.015*** 
   
  
(-3.249) 
   PDI-New ? 0.009 
   
  
(0.320) 
   PDI-AC - 
 
-0.009** 
  
   
(-2.481) 
  PDI-Non AC ? 
 
-0.008 
  
   
(-1.262) 
  PDI-Remediation - 
  
-0.010**  
    
(-2.502)  PDI-Non Remediation ? 
  
-0.004  
    
(-0.537)  PDI Entity Weakness - 
   
-0.015*** 
     
(-4.711) 
PDI Non-Entity Weakness ? 
   
-0.004 
     
(-0.723) 
Controls Included 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry and Year FE 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      Observations 
 
9,129 9,129 9,129 9,129 
Pseudo R2  0.186 0.185 0.185 0.186 
This table presents a logit regression for model (1) but modifies the PDI variable. PDI-Incumbent (New) is coded 
one if a firm in year j has an audit committee member who (i) concurrently serves on the board of a disclosing firm 
in a year that is during the disclosing firm’s post-disclosure period and (ii) joined the disclosing firm’s board before 
(after) the ICMW disclosure; coded zero otherwise. PDI-AC is coded one if a firm in year j has an audit committee 
member who concurrently serves on the audit committee of the board of a disclosing firm in a year that is during the 
disclosing firm’s post-disclosure period; coded zero otherwise. PDI-Non AC is coded one if a sample firm in year j 
has an audit committee member who concurrently serves on the board (but not on the audit committee) of a 
disclosing firm in a year that is during the disclosing firm’s post-disclosure period; coded zero otherwise. PDI (Non) 
Remediation is coded one if a firm in year j has an audit committee member who (i) concurrently serves on the 
board of a disclosing firm in a year that is during the disclosing firm’s post-disclosure period and (ii) the disclosing 
firm remediated (did not remediate) its weakness; coded zero otherwise. PDI-(Non) Entity Weakness is coded one if 
a firm in year j has an audit committee member who (i) concurrently serves on the board of a disclosing firm in a 
year that is during the disclosing firm’s post-disclosure period and (ii) the disclosing firm’s material weakness is 
(not) classified an entity-wide weakness; coded zero otherwise. The dependent variable is ICMW, which is coded 
one if the firm reports a material weakness under SOX 404 and zero otherwise. Control variables from model (1) are 
included but omitted for brevity. The table presents the marginal effects and z-statistics (in parentheses) of each 
variable. Industry and year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered by firm. ** and *** represent 
significance at the 5 percent and 1 percent levels using a two-tailed test. 
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Table 5: Controlling for director quality 
  
Variable Prediction 
(1) 
ICMW 
(2) 
No Board 
Turnover ICMW 
PDI - -0.009** -0.008** 
  
(-2.146) (-2.224) 
High Quality Director ? 0.003 
 
  
(0.873) 
 Controls Included 
 
Yes Yes 
Industry and Year FE 
 
Yes Yes 
    Observations 
 
9,129 2,761 
Pseudo R2  0.185 0.234 
This table presents a logit regression for model (1). The dependent variable in column 1 is ICMW, which is coded 
one if the firm reports a material weakness under SOX 404 and zero otherwise. The independent variable in column 
1 is PDI, which is coded one if a firm in year j has an audit committee member who concurrently serves on the 
board of a disclosing firm in a year that is during the disclosing firm’s post-disclosure period; coded zero otherwise. 
High Quality Director is coded one if a firm has an audit committee member whose total board seats is above the 
sample median of board seats for all directors in the sample; coded zero otherwise. Column 2 runs model (1) only on 
the subsample of observations without any board turnover between the prior and current year. Control variables 
from model (1) are included but omitted for brevity. The table presents the marginal effects and z-statistics (in 
parentheses) of each variable. Industry and year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered by firm. ** 
represents significance at the 5 percent level using a two-tailed test. 
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Table 6: Director selection analysis 
 Panel A: Controlling for director selection  
     
 Variable Prediction ICMW 
PDI-Alternative - -0.006** 
  
(-2.396) 
Controls Included 
 
Yes 
Industry and Year FE 
 
Yes 
   Observations 
 
9,129 
Pseudo R2  0.184 
 
Panel B: AC Director Selection Model 
 
   
   
 Variable  Prediction New Dir 
Post Disclosure  - -0.018*** 
 
 (-6.067) 
Similar Size  0.004 
 
 (1.033) 
Same Industry  0.000 
 
 (0.346) 
Same Region  0.007* 
 
 (1.951) 
Age  -0.002*** 
 
 (-18.214) 
Avg Perf  0.007* 
 
 (1.844) 
Directorships  0.015*** 
 
 (7.864) 
Year FE  Yes 
 
 
 Observations  35,376 
Pseudo R2  0.089 
Panel A presents model (1) but modifies PDI. PDI-Alternative is coded one if a firm in year j has an audit 
committee member who (i) concurrently serves on the board of a disclosing firm in a year that is during the 
disclosing firm’s post-disclosure period and (ii) was on the connected firm’s board before the time of ICMW 
disclosure by the disclosing firm; coded zero otherwise. The dependent variable is ICMW, which is coded one if the 
firm reports a material weakness under SOX 404 and zero otherwise. Control variables from model (1) are included 
but omitted for brevity. Panel B presents a selection model for newly appointed directors with audit committee 
experience. The dependent variable, New Dir, is coded one if the director received a new appointment in a given 
year and zero otherwise. Post Disclosure is coded one if the director experienced an ICMW disclosure in the past 
three years at any of his/her firms. Similar Size is coded one if the director sits on the board of a firm in the same 
size deciles as the prospective new firm. Same Industry and Same Region are coded one if the director sits on a 
board of a firm in the same industry or region as the prospective new firm, respectively. Age is the director’s age, 
Avg Perf is the average stock return of all of the director’s firms, and Directorships is the number of board seats held 
by the director. Year fixed effects are included and standard errors are clustered at the director level. The table 
presents the marginal effects and z-statistics (in parentheses) of each variable. *, **, and *** represent significance 
at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels using a two-tailed test. 
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Table 7: Sensitivity analysis 
     
Variable 
(1) 
Observation dropped after 
ICMW reported 
(2) 
Discrete-time logit 
model 
(3) 
2004-2007 
observations 
(4) 
2008-2012 
observations 
(5) 
Alternative interlock 
measurement 
PDI -0.008** -0.008** -0.019* -0.007*** -0.012** 
 
(-2.955) (-2.850) (-1.889) (-3.725) (-2.209) 
Controls Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      Observations 8,425 8,425 3,576 5,553 7,894 
Pseudo R2 0.178 N/A 0.117 0.186 0.192 
This table presents alternate specifications for model (1). ICMW, or a modified version of ICMW, is the dependent variable in all columns. Column 1 presents 
model (1) but modifies the dependent variable by dropping observations from the sample after they report a material weakness. Column 2, which uses the same 
modified dependent variable as in column 1, presents a discrete-time logistic model. Column 3 presents the results of model (1) for the years 2004-2007, while 
column 4 presents the model for the years 2008-2012. In column 5, the independent variable is the number of post-disclosure interlocks (PDI) scaled by total 
interlocks. The analysis of column 5 excludes observations that do not have any interlocks. PDI is coded one if a firm in year j has an audit committee member 
who concurrently serves on the board of a disclosing firm in a year that is during the disclosing firm’s post-disclosure period; coded zero otherwise. The post-
disclosure period is defined as the three-year period following the disclosing firm’s material weakness disclosure. Control variables from model (1) are included 
but omitted for brevity. The table presents the marginal effects and z-statistics (in parentheses) of each variable. Industry and year fixed effects are included. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels using a two-tailed test. 
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Table 8: Analysis of pre-disclosure period 
     
 Variable Prediction ICMW 
Pre-Disclosure Interlock  + 0.120*** 
  
(6.558) 
Controls Included 
 
Yes 
Industry and Year FE 
 
Yes 
   
Observations 
 
9,129 
Pseudo R2  0.282 
This table presents model (1) but alters the independent variable. The dependent variable is ICMW, which is coded 
one if the firm reports a material weakness under SOX 404 and zero otherwise. Pre-Disclosure Interlock is coded 
one if the firm has an audit committee member who concurrently serves on a disclosing firm in a year that is during 
that firm’s pre-disclosure period, which is defined as the three-year period leading up to the disclosing firm’s ICMW 
disclosure. Control variables from model (1) are included but omitted for brevity. The table presents the marginal 
effects and z-statistics (in parentheses) of each variable. Industry and year fixed effects are included. Standard errors 
are clustered by firm. *** represents significance at the 1 percent level using a two-tailed test. 
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